Antrium Truck Centre v. Ontario: Injurious Affection and Private Nuisance

In Antrium Truck Centre Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Transportation), 2013 SCC 13, the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the law of injurious affection, which occurs when a defendant’s activities interfere with the claimant’s use or enjoyment of land. The decision provides important guidance with respect to the circumstances in which a landowner will be entitled to compensation when their business or property is negatively affected by the construction of public works but no expropriation has occurred.

The key issue on appeal was how to determine whether an interference with the private use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable when it results from construction which serves an important public purpose.

The Court held that the reasonableness of an interference must be determined by balancing the competing interests, as in all other cases of private nuisance. That balance will be appropriately struck by answering the question of whether, in all of the circumstances, the individual claimant has shouldered a greater share of the burden of construction than it would be reasonable to expect individuals to bear without compensation.

Background

Antrim Truck Centre Ltd. (“Antrim”) owned and operated a truck stop on Highway 17 near Ottawa. For more than 25 years, the business benefited from the patronage of motorists travelling along the highway.

In 2004, the Province of Ontario constructed a new highway that significantly and permanently altered Highway 17 in a manner that restricted motorists’ access to the truck stop, decreasing the market value of the land and effectively putting the truck stop out of business.

Antrim sought compensation for injurious affection before the Ontario Municipal Board, which awarded damages of approximately $400,000 for business loss and for loss in the market value of the property.

The award was upheld by the Divisional Court of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, but set aside by the Ontario Court of Appeal on the basis that the interference was not unreasonable given the important public purposes served by the highway’s construction.

Decision

In order to establish a claim for injurious affection, Antrim had to establish three elements under the Ontario Expropriations Act:

The damage must result from action taken under statutory authority;

The action would give rise to liability but for that statutory authority; and

The damages must result from the construction and not the use of the works.

If Antrim could establish those three elements, it would be compensated for the amount by which the affected land’s market value was reduced because of the interference, and for personal and business damages.

On appeal, there was no dispute that the first and third requirements of injurious affection were met. The unresolved question was whether the second requirement was met. That is, if the highway construction had not been done under statutory authority, could Antrim have successfully sued for damages caused by the construction under the law of private nuisance?

Mr. Justice Cromwell, writing for the Court, began by observing that in order to establish a claim in private nuisance a claimant must establish that the interference with their use or enjoyment of land is both substantial and unreasonable.

To conclude that an interference is substantial, it must be shown to be “non-trivial” and “amount[ing] to more than a slight annoyance or trifling interference.” This requirement “underlines the important point that not every interference, no matter how minor or transitory, is an actionable nuisance; some interferences must be accepted as part of the normal give and take of life.”

Once the substantial interference threshold is met, the inquiry proceeds to the unreasonable interference analysis, which is concerned with whether the substantial interference was also unreasonable in all of the circumstances.

The question of whether an interference is unreasonable where that interference arises from an activity that furthers the public good “must be determined by balancing the competing interests”. In the Court’s view, that balance is “appropriately struck by answering the question whether, in all of the circumstances, the individual claimant has shouldered a greater share of the burden of construction than it would be reasonable to expect individuals to bear without compensation.”

In the traditional law of private nuisance, courts assess whether an interference is unreasonable by balancing the gravity of the harm against the utility of the defendant’s conduct. However, because the acts of a public authority will generally be of significant utility, public interests will generally outweigh the private interests affected by even very significant interferences. Accordingly, a simple balancing of private interests against public utility may well undermine the purpose of legislation that provides compensation for injurious affection.

In order to avoid that result, the Court held that “the question is not simply whether the broader public good outweighs the individual interference when the two are assigned equal weight”. Rather, “the question is whether the interference is greater than the individual should be expected to bear in the public interest without compensation”. The rationale is that “everyone must put up with a certain amount of temporary disruption caused by essential construction.”

The Court thus drew a distinction between interferences that constitute the “give and take” expected of all members of the public and “interferences that impose a disproportionate burden on individuals.” The Court observed that “the reasonableness analysis should favour the public authority where the harm to property interests, considered in light of its severity, the nature of the neighbourhood, its duration, the sensitivity of the plaintiff and other relevant factors, is such that the harm cannot reasonably be viewed as more than the claimant’s fair share of the costs associated with providing a public benefit.” Another relevant factor is whether the public authority “has made all reasonable efforts to reduce the impact of its works on neighbouring properties.”

The Court ultimately allowed the appeal on the basis that it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that, in all of the circumstances, Antrim should not be expected to endure “permanent interference with the use of its land that caused a significant diminution of its market value in order to serve the greater public good.”

It is important to recognize that Antrim was decided on the basis of Ontario’s statutory regime. Although s. 41 of the British Columbia Expropriation Act also permits claims for compensation on the basis of injurious affection, it remains unclear how Antrim will impact compensation claims in British Columbia.